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Abstract
This paper presents a new class of weighted values for level structures. The new values,
called weighted Shapley support levels values, extend the weighted Shapley values to level
structures and contain the Shapley levels value (Winter, 1989) as a special case. Since a
level structure with only two levels coincides with a coalition structure we obtain, as a
side effect, also new axiomatizations of weighted coalition structure values, presented in
Levy and McLean (1989).
Keywords Cooperative game · Level structure · (Weighted) Shapley (levels) value ·
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1 Introduction
Many organizations, companies, governments and so on are organized in hierarchical
structures. Typically we have one entity at the apex and in the following levels each
entity is splitted up in two or more subordinates which normally have a lower rank as the
superior one. A similar organizational structure, in some respects, show supply chains.
Effectiveness can be increased by sharing or pooling of physical objects, resources and
information. Queueing problems or electricity and other networks have a related back-
ground. A central characteristic of all such organizational forms is that a cooperating unit
can act as a single player to obtain cooperation benefits for the members of the unit. The
question is how realized benefits should be shared and arising costs should be allocated.
To distribute profits of cooperating coalitions the use of a cooperative game seems to be
a natural approach. Winter (1989) formulated a model for cooperative games with hierar-
chical structure, called level structure, which consists of a sequence of coalition structures
(the levels). In each level the player set is partitioned into components. Winter’s value
(Winter, 1989) for such a model, we call it Shapley levels value, extends the Owen value
(Owen, 1977), itselves an extension of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b). So this value
satisfies extensions of the symmetry axioms which are satisfied by the Owen value.
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2To treat symmetric players differently if there exist exogenous given weights for the
players, Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley values. Vidal-Puga (2012)
introduced a value for coalition structures with weights given by the size of the coalitions.
Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) extended it to level structures with a step by step
top-down proceeding. This value does not satisfy the dummy axiom. At our knowledge,
the value in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) is still the only published weighted value
for level structures.
A different approach took Levy and McLean (1989) and McLean (1991). They extended
the weighted Shapley values in general to coalition structures. Therefore they assigned
weights to the components of the coalition structure if they are regarded as players, too.
Dragan (1992) called one class of these values McLean weighted coalition structure values
and presented for them a formula related to that of the Owen value.
In this paper we introduce a new class1 of weighted values for level structures which
are extensions of these McLean weighted coalition structure values and thus also of the
weighted Shapley values. Each value of this class can be represented by a formula with
dividends (Harsanyi, 1959). The coefficients in the formulas form a dividend share system,
meaning that all coefficients are non-negative and sum up to 1 for each coalition. Thus
the values from this class coincide with payoff vectors from the Harsanyi set (Hammer,
1977; Vasil’ev, 1978) and inherit so all properties (adapted to level structures) of these
payoff vectors. We present two axiomatizations for the values of this class which can be
considered as weighted counterparts to the axiomatizations for the Shapley levels value
by Winter (1989) and Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya (2007).
An unanimity game related to a coalition T gives a short impression how each value
in our class works: each player of coalition T is supported by the weights of the largest
component containing her to divide the dividend of T , within this component all players
of T are supported by the weights of the next largest components containing her to divide
the share of the dividend previously assigned and so on. In difference, the Shapley levels
value distributes the dividends T equally among the largest components B which have
a non-empty intersection with T . Then all next largest components within of such a
component B which have a non-empty intersection with T divide the share of B equally
and so on.
The outline of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries,
section 3 presents the axioms and section 4 gives a quick look on the Shapley levels value.
As the main part we introduce in section 5 the weighted Shapley support levels values with
appropriate axiomatizations. Section 6 gives a short conclusion. An appendix (section 7)
provides all the proofs and some related lemmas.
2 Preliminaries
We denote by R the real numbers and by R++ the set of all positive real numbers. Let
U be a countably infinite set, the universe of all players, and denote by N the set of all
non-empty and finite subsets of U. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-
game) is a pair (N, v) consisting of a set of players N ∈ N and a coalition function
1This class is a special case of values for level structures proposed in Besner (2016) as f -weighted-ILS-
Shapley-values. Also exists a working paper (Besner, 2017) where this class is discussed.
3v : 2N → R, v(∅) = 0, where 2N is the power set of N . The subsets S ⊆ N are called
coalitions, v(S) is the worth of coalition S and the set of all nonempty subsets of S is
denoted by ΩS. The set of all TU-games with player set N is denoted by VN.
Let (N, v) ∈ VN and S ⊆ N . The dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi, 1959) are defined
inductively by
∆v(S) :=
{
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R), if S ∈ ΩN, and
0, if S = ∅. (1)
A game (N, uT ), T ∈ ΩN, with uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) = 0 otherwise for all S ⊆ N
is called an unanimity game. It is well-known that any coalition function v on N has
a unique presentation
v =
∑
T∈ΩN
∆v(T )uT . (2)
The marginal contribution MCvi (S) of player i ∈ N to S ⊆ N\{i} is given by
MCvi (S) := v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). We call a coalition S ⊆ N active in v if ∆v(S) 6= 0.
Player i ∈ N is called a dummy player in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}), S ⊆ N\{i};
if in addition v({i}) = 0, then i is called a null player in v; players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are
called symmetric in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), and (mutually) dependent (Nowak
and Radzik, 1995) in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
A coalition structure B on N is a partition of the player set N , i.e. a collection
of nonempty, pairwise disjoint, and mutually exhaustive subsets of N . Each B ∈ B is
called a component and B(i) denotes the component that contains a player i ∈ N . A
level structure (Winter, 1989) on N is a finite sequence B := {B0, ...,Bh+1} of coalition
structures Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, on N such that:
• B0 = {{i}: i ∈ N}.
• Bh+1 = {N}.
• For each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br is a refinement of Br+1, i. e. Br(i) ⊆ Br+1(i) for all i ∈ N .
Br is called the r-th level of B; B is the set of all components B ∈ Br of all levels Br ∈
B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h; Br(Bk) is the component of the r-th level which contains the component
Bk ∈ Bk, 0 ≤ k ≤ r ≤ h+ 1.
The collection of all level structures with player set N is denoted by LN. A TU-game
(N, v) ∈ VN together with a level structure B ∈ LN is an LS-game (N, v,B). The set of
all LS-games on N is defined by VLN. Note that each TU-game (N, v) corresponds to an
LS-game (N, v,B0) with a trivial level structure B0 := {B0,B1} and we would like to
say that each LS-game (N, v,B1), B1 := {B0,B1,B2}, corresponds to a game with coalition
structure (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974), also known as ”games with a priori unions” (Owen,
1977).
Let (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} and T ∈ ΩN. A difference to TU-games in
LS-games is that also components can operate as players. So we define for each level
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, the level structure Br := {Br0, ...,Brh+1−r} ∈ LBr as the induced r-th level
structure from B by considering the components B ∈ Br as players. There all levels
from the original level structure lower then r are dropped. In the k-th level Brk of Br,
0 ≤ k ≤ h + 1 − r, we have for each component Br+k ∈ Br+k of the (r + k)-th level in
4the original level structure B a related component Brk∈ Brk. This component Brk∈ Brk
contains the components B ∈ Br as players which are subsets of the original component
Br+k∈ Br+k so that we have Brk := {{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ Br+k} for all Br+k∈ Br+k}2.
If a coalition T =
⋃
B⊆T B, B ∈ Br, is the union of components of the r-th level from
B and we want to stress this property, T is denoted by T r. Each such T r is related to a
coalition of all players B ∈ Br, B ⊆ T r, in the induced r-th level structure, denoted by
T r := {B ∈ Br : B ⊆ T r} and vice versa. The induced r-th level game (Br, vr,Br) ∈
VLBr , where Br is the player set with B ∈ Br as players, is given by
vr(T r) := v(T r) for all T r∈ ΩBr.3 (3)
A TU-value φ is an operator that assigns to any (N, v) ∈ VN a payoff vector φ(N, v) ∈
RN, an LS-value ϕ is an operator that assigns payoff vectors ϕ(N, v, B) ∈ RN to all
LS-games (N, v, B) ∈ VLN.
We define WN := {f : N → R++} with wi := w(i) for all w ∈ WN and i ∈ N as the
set of all positive weight systems on the player set N ; for all level structures B we define
WB := {f : B → R++} with wB := w(B) for all w ∈ WB and B ∈ B as the set of all
positive weight systems on the components of all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, of a level structure
B. For a level structure B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN and an induced r-th level structure
Br related components have the same weights. So we have for all r, k, 0 ≤ r ≤ k ≤ h,
Br
k−r∈ Brk−r, Brk−r∈ Br, Bk∈ Bk, Bk∈ B,
w
Br
k−r = wBk with B
rk−r:= {B ∈ Br: B ⊆ Bk} and w
Brk−r ∈ WB
r
, wBk ∈ WB. (4)
Let (N, v) ∈ VN and w ∈W. The (simply) weighted Shapley value4 Shw (Shapley,
1953a) is defined by
Shwi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
wi∑
j∈S wj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
A special case of a weighted Shapley value, all weights are equal, is the Shapley value
Sh (Shapley, 1953b), defined by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
The best-known LS-value is the Shapley levels value5 (Winter, 1989). We introduce this
value here with a formula presented in Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996, eq. (1)):
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and for all T ∈ ΩN, T 3 i,
KT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
KrT (i), where
KrT (i) :=
1
|{B ∈ Br : B⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}| .
2Loosely speaking, from the r-th level upwards the components in both level structures are related in
such a way that the same original players from the player set N are somehow the underlying part of two
related components.
3Vaguely formulated, all coalitions of the r-th level game and the related coalitions of the original game,
they contain the same players of the original player set N in some manner, have the same worth.
4We desist from possibly null weights as in Shapley (1953a) or Kalai and Samet (1987).
5The value is also known as level(s) structure value or Winter’s (Shapley type) value. Our designation is
used e. g. in A´lvarez-Mozos et al. (2017).
5The Shapley Levels value ShL is given by
ShLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
KT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
It is easy to see that ShL coincides with Sh if B = B0.
All values above are or coincide with payoff vectors from the Harsanyi set (Hammer,
1977; Vasil’ev, 1978), also called selectope (Derks, Haller and Peters, 2000), where the
payoffs are obtained by distributing the dividends. The payoffs φpi in this set, titled
Harsanyi payoffs, are defined by
φpi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
pSi ∆v(S), i ∈ N,
where the pSi are non-negative weights in a sharing system p = (p
S
i )S∈ΩN, i∈S and sum up
to 1 for each coalition S. The collection PN on N of all such dividend share systems
p is given by
PN:=
{
p = (pSi )S∈ΩN, i∈S
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈S
pSi = 1 and p
S
i ≥ 0 for each S ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ S
}
.
3 Axioms
We refer to the following axioms for LS-values which are adaptions of standard-axioms:
Efficiency, E. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v,B) = v(N).
Null player, N. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and i ∈ N a null player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0.
Additivity, A. For all (N, v,B), (N, v′,B) ∈ VLN, we have
ϕ(N, v,B) + ϕ(N, v′,B) = ϕ(N, v + v′,B).
Marginality, M. For all (N, v,B), (N, v′,B) ∈ VLN and i ∈ N such that MCvi (S) =
MCv
′
i (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N, v′,B).
Coalitional strategic equivalence, CSE. For all (N, v,B), (N, v′,B) ∈ VLN such that
for any T ∈ ΩN, c ∈ R and all S ⊆ N ,
v(S) =
{
v′(S) + c, if S ⊇ T,
v′(S), else,
(5)
we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N, v′,B) for all i ∈ N\T.
It follow axioms which are typical for level structures. In the first one the sum of the
payoffs to all players of a component equals the sum of the payoffs to all players of another
component if both components are in the same level r, are subsets of the same component
one level higher and both components are symmetric players in the r-th level game.
Symmetry between components, SymBC6 (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v, B) ∈
VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk) and Bk, B` are
6This axiom is called coalitional symmetry in Winter (1989).
6symmetric in (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B).
A dependent player acts in a game in all coalitions which not contain the other dependent
player like a dummy, his marginal contribution to such coalitions is always zero. We
introduce a new axiom for level structures (and so also for coalition structures) that uses
this property. Here the sum of the payoffs to all players of a component divided by the
weight of this component equals the sum of the payoffs to all players of another component
divided by the weight of the other component if both components are in the same level r,
are subsets of the same component one level higher and both components are dependent
players in the r-th level game.
Weighted proportionality between components, WPBC7. For all (N, v, B) ∈
VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ WB, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), and
Bk, B` are dependent in (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBk
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)
wB`
.
Our last axiom asserts that the sum of the payoff to all players in a component coincides
with the payoff to this component if this component is regarded as a player in an induced
level game.
Level game property, LG (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B =
{B0, ...,Bh+1}, B∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, we have∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕB(Br, vr,Br). (6)
4 The Shapley levels value
Winter (1989) used the Owen value (Owen, 1977) as a starting point for his LS-value.
Therefore Winter upgraded the efficiency, null player, symmetry and additivity axioms
to axioms for level structures where symmetry is splitted up in coalitional symmetry and
individual symmetry. If a level structure is defined as above, meaning that the singletons
are the elements of the lowest level, in Winter (1989, remark 1.6) is pointed out that the
individual symmetry can be omitted. In this sense we present Winter’s first axiomatization
of the Shapley levels value8.
Theorem 4.1. (Winter, 1989) ShL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, N, SymBC
and A.
It should be noted that there exist some further axiomatizations of the Shapley levels value
(see Calvo, Lasaga and Winter 1996, Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya 2007 and Casajus
2010).
7In Nowak and Radzik (1995) the basic version of this axiom for TU-values is called ω-mutual dependence.
We call it weighted proportionality.
8Winter (1989) introduced his value axiomatically and used this axiomatization as a definition.
75 Weighted Shapley support levels values
If we allow that not only elements of the player set N but also coalitions can act as
players, e. g., as it is feasible by the Shapley set value, the question arises that symmetric
or dependent players (acting components) should no longer be treated equally if there exist
some convincing weights which are not included in the coalition function. The following
value gives one possibility to deal with such a situation, especially if two components of
the same level r which are subsets of the same component one level higher are dependent
in the r-th level game. Another characterizing part of this value is that each player
is ”supported” for her share of the related dividends by the weights of all components
including her that leads to the naming of this LS-value.
Definition 5.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ WB and for all T ∈ ΩN,
T 3 i,
Kw,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Krw,T (i), where (7)
Krw,T (i) :=
wBr(i)∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
.
The weighted Shapley support levels value ShwSL is given by
ShwSLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Kw,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (8)
Remark 5.2. We see that the Shapley levels value is a weighted Shapley support levels
value where all components have the same weight. ShwSL coincides with Shw if B = B0
and, if B = B1, the Kw,T (i) coincide with the ”λSi ” given in Dragan (1992, sec. 2(e)).
Therefore, in this case, the ShwSL coincide with the McLean weighted coalition structure
values (Dragan, 1992; Levy and McLean, 1989; McLean, 1991).
The weighted Shapley support levels values match a lot of convincing axioms, especially
those which are used in our axiomatizations.
Theorem 5.3. The weighted Shapley support levels values ShwSL satisfy E, N, A,
M/CSE, LG and WPBC.
For the proof, see appendix 7.2.1.
5.1 A characterization similar to Winter
The first axiomatization of the weighted Shapley values in Nowak and Radzik (1995)
is based on efficiency, null player, weighted proportionality and linearity. The following
theorem 5.4 shows that additivity can substitute linearity also in TU-games (the theorem
holds naturally also for a level structure with B = B0). So weighted proportionality
replaces symmetry in the classical axiomatization of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b) by
efficiency, null player , symmetry and additivity. Our axiomatization is based on the same
axioms extended to LS-games, replacing symmetry between components in theorem 4.1
by weighted proportionality between components. So we have a ”weighted” analogue to
theorem 4.1.
8Theorem 5.4. ShwSL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, N, WPBC and A.
For the proof9, see appendix 7.2.2.
5.2 A characterization similar to Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya
Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya (2007) characterized the Shapley levels value in the sense
of Young (1985) by efficiency, symmetry between components10 and marginality11. In
Casajus and Huettner (2008) is shown that coalitional strategic equivalence and marginal-
ity are equivalent in TU-games. Their proof obviously holds for LS-games too. We obtain
a characterisation which is also an extension of theorem 2.3 in Nowak and Radzik (1995).
Theorem 5.5. ShwSL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, WPBC and M/CSE.
For the proof, see appendix 7.2.3.
6 Conclusion
The rapidly increasing volume of collected data and global networking make it possi-
ble and necessary to share benefits between cooperating participants, often structured
hierarchical. To distribute generated surpluses the presented new class of LS-values is
an alternative to the Shapley levels value, founded on convincing axioms, if there exist
exogenous given weights for some coalitions. These values extend the McLean weighted
coalition structure values, satisfy the level game property, can be axiomatized by adapted
classical axiomatizations of the Shapley levels value (Winter, 1989; Khmelnitskaya and
Yanovskaya, 2007) and contain the Shapley levels value as well.
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7 Appendix
The following lemma states that each non-empty coalition S is for each level the subset of
only one coalition that is a union of components from this level which have a non-empty
intersection with S.
9Replacing dependent by symmetric and WPBC by SymBC and using that players i, j ∈ N are
symmetric in v if ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = ∆v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}), we get a new proof of theorem 4.1.
10Also here individual symmetry can be dropped if the singletons are the elements of the lowest level.
11Youngs original axiom is called strong monotonicity. In Chun (1989) the essential part of this axiom
for the proof of the uniqueness is named marginality.
97.1 Additional lemmas and a remark, used in the proofs
Lemma 7.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, Br∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Each S ∈ ΩN
is a subset of exactly one coalition T r ∈ ΩN, T r = ⋃Br⊆T r, Br∈Br,
Br∩S 6=∅
Br. Thus each S ∈ ΩN is
also uniquely referred to as ST r .
Proof. Each coalition T r∈ ΩN is a union of components B ∈ Br. Br is a partition and so
each player i ∈ S, S ∈ ΩN, is contained in only one component B ∈ Br. Thus exists for
each coalition S ∈ ΩN exactly one coalition T r∈ ΩN which is a union of all components
B ∈ Br containing at least one player i ∈ S.
The next lemma shows that for each coalition T in an induced level structure the dividend
in the induced level structure equals the sum of the dividends from all coalitions S in the
original level structure which are subsets of a coalition T related to T and have the
property of the previous lemma in relation to the coalition T .
Lemma 7.2. Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ VLN, Br∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and ST r
the coalitions from lemma 7.1 with related coalitions T r. Then we have in the r-th level
game (Br, vr,Br) for each T r∈ ΩBr, related to T r∈ ΩN,
∆vr(T r) =
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r). (9)
Proof. Let t = |{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ T r}| the number of components B ∈ Br which are subsets
from a coalition T r∈ ΩN with T r∈ ΩBr. We use induction on the size t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |Br|.
Initialisation: Let t = 1. T r is a component B ∈ Br and T r is a player in vr. We have
∆vr(T r) =
(1)
vr(T r) =
(3)
v(T r) =
(1)
∑
S⊆T r
∆v(S) =
Lem.
7.1
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r).
Induction step: Assume that eq. (9) holds for an arbitrary tˆ ≥ 1 (IH). Let now Tˆ r∈ ΩBr
with correlated Tˆ r ∈ ΩN, tˆ = |{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ Tˆ r}| and T r = Tˆ r ∪ Bˆ, Bˆ ∈ Br, Bˆ 6⊆ Tˆ r. We
have t = tˆ+ 1 and it follows
∆vr(T r) =
(1)
∑
Qr⊆T r
∆vr(Qr) =
(1)
(3)
v(T r)−
∑
Qr(T r
∆vr(Qr)
=
(1)
(IH)
∆v(T
r) +
∑
S(T r
∆v(S)−
∑
Qr(T r,
Qr⊆Br
∑
SQr⊆Qr
∆v(SQr)
=
Lem.
7.1
∆v(T
r) +
∑
S(T r
∆v(S)−
∑
S(T r,
S 6=STr
∆v(S)
= ∆v(T
r) +
∑
STr(T r
∆v(ST r) =
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r).
Lemma 7.3. Players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are dependent in v ∈ VN, iff ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0,
k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
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Proof. Let i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and v ∈ VN. We show by induction on the size s := |S| of all
coalitions S ⊆ N\{i, j}
∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0 ⇔ v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k}). (10)
Initialisation: If S = ∅ and so s = 0, statement (10) is satisfied.
Induction step: Assume that equality in (10) and such equivalence hold for all coalitions
S˜ ⊆ N\{i, j}, |S˜| ≤ s′, s′ ≥ 0, (IH) and let s = s′ + 1 and k ∈ {i, j}. We get
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k})
⇔
(1)
∆v(S ∪ {k}) +
∑
R((S∪{k})
∆v(R) =
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) + ∆v({k})
⇔
(IH)
∆v(S ∪ {k}) + ∆v({k}) +
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) =
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) + ∆v({k})
⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0.
Remark 7.4. It is well-known or easy to prove that statement (5) in CSE can be replaced
equivalently by
∆v(S) =
{
∆v′(T ) + c, if S = T,
∆v′(S), otherwise.
7.2 Proofs
Convention 7.5. To avoid cumbersome case distinctions in the proves using WPBC if
there is only one single player assessed in isolation, she is defined as dependent by herself.
Then WPBC is trivially satisfied.
7.2.1 Proof of theorem 5.3
Let (N, v, B), (N, v′, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ WB and Krw,T the expressions
according to def. 5.1.
• E, N, A, M/CSE: Let T ∈ ΩN, j ∈ T. It is easy to show, by induction on r, that∑
i∈Br+1(j), i∈T
r∏
`=0
Krw,T (i) = 1.
So
∑
i∈T Kw,T (i) = 1 and, with Kw,T (i) > 0, i ∈ T, the Kw,T (i) form a dividend share
system p ∈ PN and ShwSL coincides with a Harsanyi payoff. Therefore ShwSL satisfies all
for level structures simply adapted axioms which are, as related TU-axioms, satisfied by
a Harsanyi payoff, in particular E, N, A and M/CSE are well-known matched axioms.
• LG: Let Br∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1. If r = 0, eq. (6) trivially is satisfied because the 0-th
level game corresponds to the original LS-game, if r = h+ 1, eq. (6) is satisfied by E.
Let now 1 ≤ r ≤ h. We have for all S ⊆ N, S ∩Br 6= ∅,
∑
i∈Br, i∈S
r−1∏
`=0
K`w,S(i) = 1. (11)
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In the game (Br, vr,Br) we have for all T r∈ ΩBr, Br∈ T r,
Kw,T r(Br) =
h∏
`=r
K`−rw,T r(B
r). (12)
Let i ∈ Br, r ≤ ` ≤ h, and ST r the coalitions from lemma 7.1 with related coalitions T r.
We have B`(i) = B`(Br). Notice that for each T r ∈ ΩBr, related to T r ∈ ΩN, if i ∈ ST r ,
we have also Br∈ T r. It follows for all ST r ∈ ΩN, i ∈ ST r ,
K`w,STr (i) =Def.
5.1
wB`(i)∑
B∈B`:B⊆B`+1(i),
B∩STr 6=∅
wB
=
Lem.
7.1
wB`(Br)∑
B∈B`:B⊆B`+1(Br),
B∩T r 6=∅
wB
=
(4)
wBr`−r(Br)∑
B∈Br`−r:B⊆Br`+1−r(Br),
B∩T r 6=∅
wB
=
Def.
5.1
K`−rw,T r(B
r). (13)
Thus we have for all ST r ∈ ΩN, Br∈ T r, T r∈ ΩBr,∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
Kw,STr (i) =
(7)
∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
h∏
`=0
K`w,STr (i) =(13)
∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
r−1∏
`=0
K`w,STr (i)
h∏
`=r
K`−rw,T r(B
r)
=
(11)
h∏
`=r
K`−rw,T r(B
r) =
(12)
Kw,T r(Br). (14)
Finally we get∑
i∈Br
ShwSLi (N, v,B) =
(8)
∑
i∈Br
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
Kw,S(i)∆v(S) =
Lem.
7.1
∑
i∈Br
∑
STr⊆N,
STr3i
Kw,STr (i)∆v(ST r)
=
∑
STr⊆N
∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
Kw,STr (i)∆v(ST r) =
(14)
∑
STr⊆N,T r3Br
Kw,T r(Br)∆v(ST r)
=
Lem.
7.1
∑
T r⊆Br, T r3Br
Kw,T r(Br)
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r)
=
Lem.
7.2
∑
T r⊆Br, T r3Br
Kw,T r(Br)∆vr(T r) =
Def.
5.1
ShwSLBr (Br, vr,Br).
• WPBC: Let k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and Br(k),Br(`) be dependent in
vr for the LS-game (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr. If r = 0, then k, ` are dependent in v and we get
ShwSLk (N, v,B)
w{k}
=
(8)
∑
T⊆N,T3k
Kw,T (k)
w{k}
∆v(T ) =
Lem.
7.3
∑
T⊆N, {k,`}⊆T
Kw,T (k)
w{k}
∆v(T )
=
Def.
5.1
∑
T⊆N, {k,`}⊆T
Kw,T (`)
w{`}
∆v(T ) =
ShwSL` (N, v,B)
w{`}
.
Thus we have also in the r-th level game, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
ShwSLBr(k)(Br, vr,Br)
wBr(k)
=
ShwSLBr(`)(Br, vr,Br)
wBr(`)
and the claim follows by LG.
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7.2.2 Proof of theorem 5.4
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ WB, S ∈ ΩN arbitrary and ϕ an LS-value
which satisfies all axioms of theorem 5.4. Due to theorem 5.3, property (2) and A, it is
sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely defined on the game vS := ∆v(S) · uS.
By lemma 7.1 exists for each level r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, exactly one coalition T rS , T rS ⊆ Br, which
is the smallest coalition of all Rr, Rr ⊇ S, with correlated Rr⊆ Br and so in each game(Br, vrS,Br) ∈ VLBr we have ∆vrS(T rS ) = ∆v(S) and ∆vrS(Rr) = 0 for Rr ⊆ Br, Rr 6= T rS .
Therefore, by lemma 7.3, possibly using conv. 7.5, all components B ∈ Br, B ∩S 6= ∅, are
dependent in vrS. If B ∈ Br, B ∩ S = ∅, we have
∑
i∈B ϕi(N, vS,B) = 0 by N.
We use induction on the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ h, for all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, with m := h−r.
Initialisation: Let m = 0 and so r = h. We get for an arbitrary i ∈ S∑
B∈Bh,
B∩S 6=∅
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
B∈Bh,
B∩S 6=∅
wB
wBh(i)
∑
j∈Bh(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(E)
∆v(S)
⇔
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
[ h∏
k=h−m
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S). (15)
Induction step: Assume that eq. (15) holds to ϕ with an arbitrary m−1, 0 ≤ m−1 ≤ h−1
(IH). It follows for an arbitrary i ∈ S∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
wB
wBr(i)
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B)
=
(IH)
[ h∏
k=h−m+1
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S)
⇔
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
[ h∏
k=h−m
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S).
So ϕ is uniquely defined on vS (take m = h and so r = 0).
7.2.3 Proof of theorem 5.5
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ WB and ϕ an LS-value which satisfies all
axioms of theorem 5.5. By theorem 5.3 we have only to show that ϕ satisfies eq. (8).
We use a first induction I1 on t := |{T ⊆ N : T is active in v}|.
Initialisation I1: Let t = 0, then for all games (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, vr is
identically zero on all coalitions. So all players, possibly using conv. 7.5, are dependent
in each game vr and for all Brk, B
r
` ∈ Br, Br` ⊆ Br+1(Brk) we have∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBrk
=
(WPBC)
∑
i∈Br`
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBr`
.
We use a second induction I2 on the size m := h− r to show∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all 0 ≤ r ≤ h and Br∈ Br. (16)
13
Initialisation I2: Let m = 0 and so r = h. We get for an arbitrary B
h
k ∈ Bh∑
Bh∈Bh
∑
i∈Bh
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Bh∈Bh
wBh
wBhk
∑
i∈Bhk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(E)
0.
Thus follows
∑
i∈Bh ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all Bh∈ Bh because wBh > 0 and Bhk was arbitrary.
Induction step I2: Assume that eq. (16) holds to ϕ if m ≥ 0 (IH2). We get for an
arbitrary Brk ∈ Br∑
Br∈Br,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Br∈Br,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
wBr
wBrk
∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(IH2)
0.
It follows
∑
i∈Br ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all 0 ≤ r ≤ h and Br ∈ Br. Therefore we have also
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all i ∈ N and eq. (8) is satisfied for ϕ if t = 0.
Induction step I1: Assume that eq. (8) holds to ϕ if t ≥ 0, (IH1). Let exactly t + 1
coalitions Qk ⊆ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ t+ 1, active in v and denote
Q :=
⋂
1≤k≤t+1
Qk.
We distinguish two cases: (a) i ∈ N\Q and (b) i ∈ Q.
(a) Each player i ∈ N\Q is a member of at most t active coalitions Qk and v gets at
least one active coalition Ti, i /∈ Ti. Hence exists a coalition function vi ∈ VLN, where
all coalitions have the same dividend in vi as in v, except the coalition Ti, that gets the
dividend ∆vi(Ti) = 0, and there is existing a scalar c ∈ R, c 6= 0, with
∆v(S) =
{
∆vi(Ti) + c, if S = Ti,
∆vi(S), else.
By remark 7.4 and CSE we get ϕi(v) = ϕi(vi) with i ∈ N\Ti and, because there exists
for all i ∈ N\Q a such Ti, it follows ϕi(v) = ϕi(vi) for all i ∈ N\Q. All coalition functions
vi get at most t active coalitions and by (IH1) we have
ϕi(v) = Sh
wSL
i (N, v,B) for all i ∈ N\Q. (17)
(b) Each player j ∈ Q is a member of all t+ 1 active coalitions Qk ⊆ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ t+ 1,
and therefore, by lemma 7.3 and conv. 7.5, all players j ∈ Q are dependent in v. Now we
define for each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, a set
BrQ := {Br∈ Br : Br∩Q 6= ∅}.
Note that all components Brk, B
r
` ∈ BrQ, Br` ⊆ Br+1(Brk), are dependent in vr. We use a
third induction I3 on the size s := h− r to show for all Brk ∈ BrQ∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Brk
ShwSLi (N, v,B). (18)
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Initialisation I3: Let s = 0 and so r = h. We get for an arbitrary B
h
k ∈ BhQ∑
Bh∈BhQ
∑
i∈Bh
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Bh∈BhQ
wBh
wBhk
∑
i∈Bhk
ϕi(N, v,B)
=
(E)
(17)
∑
Bh∈BhQ
∑
i∈Bh
ShwSLi (N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Bh∈BhQ
wBh
wBhk
∑
i∈Bhk
ShwSLi (N, v,B)
⇔
∑
i∈Bhk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Bhk
ShwSLi (N, v,B).
Induction step I3: Assume that eq. (18) holds to ϕ if s ≥ 0 (IH3). We get for an
arbitrary Brk ∈ BrQ and because Br+1(Brk) ∈ Br+1Q∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
wBr
wBrk
∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B)
=
(IH3)
(17)
∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
∑
i∈Br
ShwSLi (N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
wBr
wBrk
∑
i∈Brk
ShwSL(N, v,B)
⇔
∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Brk
ShwSLi (N, v,B)
and so finally
ϕi(N, v,B) = ShwSLi (N, v,B) for all i ∈ Q.
By Casajus and Huettner (2008) M and CSE are equivalent in TU-games. Their proof
holds obviously also for LS-games and the proof of theorem 5.5 is complete.
7.3 Logical independence
All axiomatizations must hold if B = B0, too. In this case all axioms, used for axiomatiza-
tion in this paper, coincide with usual axioms for TU-values. So the given axiomatizations
coincide in this case with axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values. It is well-known
or easy to proof that in this case the used axioms are logical independent. Therefore all
axioms for LS-values must be also logical independent in the given axiomatizations.
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